Near Disaster at Cedar Creek in an Election Year Crook Ignores Reports From Two Jessie Scouts

After assuming command in the Shenandoah Valley in the later summer of 1864, Philip Sheridan was victorious in a series of battles that began with the defeat of Jubal Early on September 19, 1864 in the Third Battle of Winchester. Three days later, he again defeated Early at Fisher’s Hill as the Union army started on a campaign to destroy the Valley’s capability to provide food for the Confederacy. The “Breadbasket” of the Confederacy was soon to suffer what was soon referred to as the “Burning” in thirteen days of destruction that destroyed the areas stored grain, mills, livestock, and barns that extended the burnings that began under General Hunter earlier in the year. After defeating Early’s weakened forces at Tom’s Brook on October 9th, Union control of the Shenandoah Valley was believed unchallengeable by the serial defeats suffered by the Confederate forces.

Sheridan withdrew his army to the relative security near Middletown and entrenched in a strong defensive position on the banks of Cedar Creek that was protected by the natural defenses provided by the steep slopes of the Massanutten Mountain and the Shenandoah River. Leaving General Horatio Wright in command, Sheridan departed on October 15th to attend a strategy conference in Washington, D.C. , while the pugnacious Early began to develop plans for a counterattack.

Sheridan depended on his Jessie Scouts to determine the locations and intentions of the Confederate forces opposing him. He explained in his autobiography:

“I felt the need of an efficient body of scouts to collect information regarding the enemy, for the defective intelligence-establishment with which I started out from Harper’s Ferry early in August had not proved satisfactory. I therefore began to organize my scouts on a system which I hoped would give better results than bad the method hitherto pursued in the department, which was to employ on this service doubtful citizens and Confederate deserters. If these should turn out untrustworthy, the mischief they might do us gave me grave apprehension, and I finally concluded that those of our own soldiers who should volunteer for the delicate and hazardous duty would be the most valuable material, and decided that they should have a battalion organization and be commanded by an officer, Major H. K. Young, of the First Rhode Island Infantry. These men were disguised in Confederate uniforms whenever necessary, were paid from the Secret-Service Fund in proportion to the value of the intelligence they furnished, which often stood us in good stead in checking the forays of Gilmore, Mosby, and other irregulars.”

Other forces were also in motion during this period. Confederate General John B. Gordon was also experienced, aggressive, and was organizing troops available to him for a potential counterattack as Sheridan’s campaign seemed to stall following his victory at Tom’s Brook. Gordon wrote of what he viewed as “Sheridan’s dallying” for nearly a month:

“Nearly a month — twenty-six days, to be exact — of comparative rest and recuperation ensued after Fisher’s Hill. General Sheridan followed our retreat very languidly. The record of one day did not differ widely from the record of every other day of the twenty-six. His cavalry manoeuvred before ours, and ours manoeuvred before his. His artillery saluted, and ours answered. His infantry made demonstrations, and ours responded by forming lines. This was all very fine for Early’s battered little army; and it seemed that Sheridan’s victories of the 19th and 22d had been so costly, notwithstanding his great preponderance in numbers, that he sympathized with our desire for a few weeks of dallying. He appeared to be anxious to do just enough to keep us reminded that he was still there. So he decided upon a season of burning, instead of battling; of assaults with matches and torches upon barns and hay stacks, instead of upon armed men who were lined up in front of him…

“I have already spoken of General Sheridan as probably the most brilliant cavalry officer who fought on the Union side. I shall not be misunderstood, therefore, when I say that his twenty-six days of apparent indecision, of feeble pursuit, of discursive and disjointed fighting after his two crushing victories, are to me a military mystery.

“The magnificently mounted and equipped Union cavalry alone very nearly equaled in number Early’s entire army. With an open country and fordable streams before him, with an immense preponderance in numbers, it seems incomprehensible that General Sheridan should have failed to destroy utterly General Early’s army by promptly and vigorously following up the advantages resulting at Winchester and Fisher’s Hill.

“The arrival of reënforcements under Kershaw not only revived the hopes of our high-mettled men, but enabled General Early and his division commanders to await with confidence General Sheridan’s advance, which was daily expected. He did not come, however. Our rations were nearly exhausted, and after holding a council of war, General Early decided to advance upon the Union forces strongly intrenched on the left bank of Cedar Creek.

“I undertook the ascent of the rugged steep, accompanied by that superb officer, General Clement A. Evans of Georgia, in whose conservatism and sound judgment I had the most implicit confidence, and by Captain Hotchkiss of General Early’s staff, and my chief of staff, Major Robert W. Hunter. Through tangled underbrush and over giant boulders and jutting cliffs we finally reached the summit, from which the entire landscape was plainly visible. It was an inspiring panorama. With strong field-glasses, every road and habitation and hill and stream could be seen and noted. The abruptly curved and precipitous highlands bordering Cedar Creek, on which the army of Sheridan was strongly posted; the historic Shenandoah, into which Cedar Creek emptied at the foot of the towering peak on which we stood, and, most important and intensely interesting of all, the entire Union army — all seemed but a stone’s throw away from us as we stood contemplating the scene through the magnifying lenses of our field-glasses. Not only the general outlines of Sheridan’s breastworks, but every parapet where his heavy guns were mounted, and every piece of artillery, every wagon and tent and supporting line of troops, were in easy range of our vision. I could count, and did count, the number of his guns. I could see distinctly the three colors of trimmings on the jackets respectively of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and locate each, while the number of flags gave a basis for estimating approximately the forces with which we were to contend in the proposed attack. If, however, the plan of battle which at once suggested itself to my mind should be adopted, it mattered little how large a force General Sheridan had; for the movement which I intended to propose contemplated the turning of Sheridan’s flank where he least expected it, a sudden irruption upon his left and rear, and the complete surprise of his entire army.

“This plan was finally adopted by General Early, and the movement was begun with the coming of the darkness. The men were stripped of canteens and of everything calculated to make noise and arouse Sheridan’s pickets below us, and our watches were set so that at the same moment the right, the centre, and the left of Sheridan should be assaulted. With every man, from the commanders of divisions to the brave privates under them, impressed with the gravity of our enterprise, speaking only when necessary and then in whispers, and striving to suppress every sound, the long gray line like a great serpent glided noiselessly along the dim pathway above the precipice. Before the hour agreed upon for the simultaneous attack, my entire command had slowly and safely passed the narrow and difficult defile.

“Some watchful and keen-eyed Confederate thought he discovered ahead of us two of the enemy’s pickets. If they should fire their rifles it would give to Sheridan’s vedettes the alarm and possibly seriously interfere with our success. I sent Jones of my staff, with a well-trained scout and one or two others, noiselessly to capture them. Concealing their movements behind a fence until near the point where the pickets stood, my men crawled on hands and knees, and were in the act of demanding surrender when they discovered that the two hostile figures were cedar-bushes in the corner of the rail fence.

“In my survey of the field from the mountain-top I had located Sheridan’s headquarters; and this daring Virginian enthusiastically agreed to ride into the Union camps on the heels of the flying body of Federal cavalry, and, by sudden dash at headquarters, attempt to capture the commander-in-chief and bring him back as a cavalry trophy.

“The surprise was complete. The victory was won in a space of time inconceivably short, and with a loss to the Confederates incredibly small. Sheridan’s brave men had lain down in their tents on the preceding night feeling absolutely protected by his intrenchments and his faithful riflemen who stood on guard. They were startled in their dreams and aroused from their slumbers by the rolls of musketry in nearly every direction around them, and terrified by the whizzing of Minié balls through their tents and the yelling of exultant foemen in their very midst.”

“In about two hours the first thing we knew a bullet came and cut through the blanket we had for a window and we got up in a hurry and didn’t stop to dress but saved the horses. We got out and rode back across the creek and Gen. Wright , another of the 6th Corps was there and said to the boys: “You scouts had better fall back. This will be no place for those uniforms in a few minutes.” Campbell and I started to ride back, and about three miles north of Newtown I said to Campbell: ‘This looks like a trip to Maryland again. He agreed with me.’”

John Gordon Continued his account of the battle:

“At little after sunrise we had captured nearly all of the Union artillery; we had scattered in veriest rout two thirds of the Union army; while less than one third of the Confederate forces had been under fire, and that third intact and jubilant. Only the Sixth Corps of Sheridan’s entire force held its ground. It was on the right rear and had been held in reserve. It stood like a granite breakwater, built to beat back the oncoming flood; but it was also doomed unless some marvelous intervention should check the Confederate concentration which was forming against it. That intervention did occur, as will be seen; and it was a truly marvelous intervention, because it came from the Confederate commander himself. Sheridan’s Sixth Corps was so situated after the other corps were dispersed, that nothing could have saved it if the arrangement for its destruction had been carried out. It was at that hour largely outnumbered, and I had directed every Confederate command then subject to my orders to assail it in front and upon both flanks simultaneously. At the same time I had directed the brilliant chief of artillery, Colonel Thomas H. Carter of Virginia, who had no superior in ability and fighting qualities in that arm of the service in either army, to gallop along the broad highway with all his batteries and with every piece of captured artillery available, and to pour an incessant stream of shot and shell upon this solitary remaining corps, explaining to him at the same time the movements I had ordered the infantry to make. As Colonel Carter surveyed the position of Sheridan’s Sixth Corps (it could not have been better placed for our purposes), he exclaimed: ‘General, you will need no infantry. With enfilade fire from my batteries I will destroy that corps in twenty minutes.’ 

At this moment General Early came upon the field, and said:

“Well, Gordon, this is glory enough for one day. This is the 19th. Precisely one month ago to-day we were going in the opposite direction.’

“His allusion was to our flight from Winchester on the 19th of September. I replied: ‘It is very well so far, general; but we have one more blow to strike, and then there will not be left an organized company of infantry in Sheridan’s army.’

“I pointed to the Sixth Corps and explained the movements I had ordered, which I felt sure would compass the capture of that corps — certainly its destruction. When I had finished, he said: ‘No use in that; they will all go directly.’

“That is the Sixth Corps, general. It will not go, unless we drive it from the field.’

“Yes, it will go too, directly.’

“My heart went into my boots. Visions of the fatal halt on the first clay at Gettysburg, and of the whole day’s hesitation to permit an assault on Grant’s exposed flank on the 6th of May in the Wilderness, rose before me. And so it came to pass that the fatal halting, the hesitation, the spasmodic firing, and the isolated movements in the face of the sullen, slow, and orderly retreat of this superb Federal corps, lost us the great opportunity, and converted the brilliant victory of the morning into disastrous defeat in the evening.”

Rowand describes the key event of the day that resulted in the Union forces being able to salvage a victory from the near-disaster:

“Just then I looked across a large clear field and saw a black horse at full speed coming out of the woods, and I said to Campbell: ‘There comes the ‘Old Man.’ He said: ‘No. He is in Washington.’ I looked for a moment and then said: ‘That’s him. There come a couple of his staff about a couple hundred yards back of him.’ We stopped and Gen. Sheridan came up, stopped his horse, and said: ‘Boys, how is it?’ Campbell replied: ‘General, it is a rout.’ He threw his eyes quick at me and said: ‘Not quite that bad. The 8th and 19th are scattered, but the 6th is solid.’ He wheeled to a Lieut. With a 19th Corps badge on his cap and said: ‘Where is you command?’ Said he: ‘I don’t know.’ Gen. Sheridan said: ‘Damn you, turn back and find it.’ The Lieut. Turned back at me and said: ‘Scout, who is that?’ I said: ‘General Sheridan.’ He said: ‘I will turn back.’

“Sheridan in the meantime was hallooing for the boys to turn back, and when the line was formed, he rode from the left along the rear of the line for quite a distance, then came around the front of the line. The Confederates were giving us a shell every once in a while, and we got within about two hundred feet of the Pike coming back, one of the man called out to him: ‘General, where will we sleep tonight?’ The Gen. stopped his horse, looked around and said: ‘We will sleep in our old camp tonight, or we will sleep in Hell.’ Then we gave him a rousing cheer — Not with the expectation of sleeping in Hell, but the boys knew from what he said they would go back to their old camp that night. He rode across the Pike and in a moment or two he gave the signal for the advance. History tells the rest.” 

John Gordon wrote of his disappointment that the attack had not been continued:

“Although Sheridan’s army at the beginning of the battle outnumbered Early’s, according to official reports, nearly or quite three to one, yet the complete surprise of our sudden attack at dawn upon flank and rear had placed the brave men in blue at such disadvantage that more than two thirds of them were compelled to fly or be captured. Thus before eight o’clock in the morning the Confederate infantry outnumbered the organized Federal forces in our front. At this hour the one army was aroused and electrified by victory, while all that remained of the other was necessarily dismayed by the most adverse conditions, especially by the panic that had seized and shaken to pieces the Eighth and Nineteenth corps.

“The brave and steady Sixth Corps could not possibly have escaped had the proposed concentration upon it occurred.”

The National Park Service provided an excellent account of Sheridan’s return to his beleaguered army:

“Having returned to Winchester from his strategy conference in Washington, D.C., the evening of October 18, Sheridan retired to bed, no doubt believing that all was well with his army camped along Cedar Creek to the south. He anticipated sleeping late the morning of October 19, 1864, but around 7:00 a.m., Sheridan was awakened by an officer who had been on picket duty and heard artillery fire to the south. Initially Sheridan waved him off — a reconnaissance-in-force had been ordered that morning, so the fire the officer heard was because of that. Sheridan tried to get back to sleep, but apparently was concerned, and soon got up, and — with artillery fire still heard — determined to return to the army.

“Around 9:00 a.m., Sheridan, riding his horse, Rienzi, followed by his aides Major George A. “Sandy” Forsyth and Captain Joseph O’Keefe, and an escort of some twenty troopers, started off south.

“Even after three years of war, with armies from both sides tramping up and down the Shenandoah Valley, the Valley Pike provided a good macadamized surface. Ruts created by the passing of artillery and wagons were avoided, and Sheridan’s small entourage made good time.

“It was a golden, sunny day that had succeeded a densely foggy morning,” Sandy Forsyth wrote later, but it wasn’t long before they came on supply wagons heading north. Ordered to halt and await further instructions, Sheridan and his staff members rode on. But now it was apparent that something had gone wrong. Soon they came on more evidence of a Federal retreat, “now and then a group of soldiers…the first driftwood of a flood just beyond and soon to come sweeping down the road,” Forsyth recalled.

“By then Sheridan’s face had taken on a determined look; he was aware that a disaster of some proportion had befallen his army. When the general saw groups of soldiers, “sitting or lying down to rest by the side of the road, while others were making coffee,” Sheridan vigorously waved his hat to the front, calling for them to “Turn back, men! Turn back! Face the other way!” Most of the soldiers did just that, and all broke into cheers “Sheridan! Sheridan!” at the sight of their leader.

“A few miles more, they reached Newtown (Stephen’s City today), where they found a field hospital, ambulances in abundance, and wounded men all around. Here Sheridan, Forsyth and O’Keefe — their cavalry escort had been left behind — left the pike briefly, rode through a small wooded area, and up a slight hill. Reaching the top of that rise, Sheridan later described the scene: “there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of panic…hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of others unhurt but utterly demoralized, and baggage wagons by the score, all pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling all plainly that a disaster had occurred at the front.”

“About 10:30 a.m., they reached the army, then positioned 1.5 miles north of Middletown. One of the first officers they met, Colonel Amasa Tracey, commanding the Vermont Brigade, saluted Sheridan: “General, we’re glad to see you,” Tracey said. “Well, by God, I’m glad to be here. What troops are these?” “Sixth Corps! Vermont Brigade!” the soldiers nearby yelled, delighted to see their commanding general among them again. “All right, we’re all right!” Sheridan’s reported to have said. “We’ll have our camps by night!”

Sheridan ‘s arrival had saved the Union army from a defeat that would have possibly resulted in the annual Union army trip to Maryland anticipated by Arch Rowand in his comment to scout Jim Campbell that was likely to be the result of a Union loss and the Confederate army maneuvering into Maryland and in the general direction of national capital. Worse, 1864 was an election year and Abraham Lincoln was opposed by George McClellan, a Democrat leading a party that developed a peace platform that called for a negotiated end of the Civil War. Once nominated. McClellan repudiated the peace platform and promised to prosecute the war to victory while Lincoln and the Republicans were concerned that the Copperhead Movement within the Democrat Party would gradually force a negotiated settlement. Sherman’s capture of Atlanta on September 2 generally ensured the continuation of the war, but if there had been a defeat at Cedar Creek and a Confederate move toward Maryland, the political momentum would have been reversed in the direction of the Copperhead Democrats.

After ignoring the warnings from the Jessie Scout team comprised of Dominic Fannin and Alvin Sterns, Crook’s command was hit hardest in John Gordon’s initial assault. His animosity toward his West Point roommate, Sheridan, grew exponentially as Sheridan received national acclaim for saving the day at Cedar Creek. Crook claims in his autobiography that Sheridan said, “Crook, I am going to get much more credit than I deserve, for, had I been here in the morning the same thing would have taken place, and had I not returned today, the same thing would have taken place.”

Jenniger Pesonen wrote in the Baltimore Sun that “Crook visited the site of the battle 25 years later, and his diary entry for that day indicates that he still had not forgiven Sheridan:

“After examining the grounds and position of the troops after 25 years which have elapsed and in the light of subsequent events, it renders General Sheridan’s claims and his subsequent actions in allowing the general public to remain under the impressions regarding his part in these battles, when he knew they were fiction, all the more contemptible.

“The adulations heaped on him by a grateful nation for his supposed genius turned his head, which, added to his natural disposition, cause him to bloat his little carcass with debauchery and dissipation, which carried him off prematurely.”