Sheridan’s Jessie Scouts Difficulties in Researching Classified Operations — Even During the Civil War 

The actual account of the first operation conducted by Young to test his new scouts illustrates some problems associated with research into the history of classified operations that remained confidential for long periods after the war was over. In the case of the raid against the Confederate cavalry brigade, there is an account developed for Harpers Monthly Magazine that was researched by William Gilmore Beymer, probably through correspondence with Oliver Edwards, Young’s commander in the Army of the Potomac who was also transferred to Sheridan’s command after Early’s 1864 aborted attack on Washington, and scouts Archibald Rowand and Sergeant Joseph McCabe with whom Beymer developed a relationship. Union brigade commander Oliver Edwards was in a position to know about Young’s covert, classified operations as Young previously served as Edwards’ Brigade Inspector General and the two officers were sufficiently close that Young accompanied Edwards on leave to meet his family in Massachusetts. Unfortunately, Beymer’s account of the raid was met with some skepticism by many individuals who read the published account in Harpers Magazine. Was this just another war story told by an old soldier? This was the first thought of nearly everyone who has read about the attack on the Confederate cavalry and most initial readers believeb independent verification was needed for Beymer’s magazine articles. Some verification may be developed by a close examination of the alleged connections between Edwards and Young. 

Edwards stated that the commander of Sheridan’s scouts, Henry H. Young, was once his inspector general and a review of Young’s military service record shows that he served as an officer in the Second Rhode Island Infantry Regiment. The question naturally arises, “How did the two officers come together, if Edward’s account is correct?”

Edwards commanded the 37th Massachusetts Infantry that was assigned along with the Second Rhode Island within the Fourth Brigade, Second Division, Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac when Grant ordered his men forward across the Rapidan in early May, 1864. At the time the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, Young was reported to be absent from his regiment in a muster roll for May and June, 1864, but the remarks on the muster roll provides information on his location and duties. According to the muster roll, Young was appointed Inspector General for the Fourth Brigade, Second Division, Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac. These records verify Oliver Edwards’ claim that Young served with him prior to his appointment as Sheridan’s Chief of Scouts. Edwards knew the youthful Henry Young and was in a position to learn a great deal about the operations conducted by Sheridan’s Scouts.

Henry Young’s Regiment Containing Information on Young

The new Jessie Scout commander was moving into a “cover position” as Sheridan’s “acting Aide de Camp” instead of “Chief of Scouts” while assigned to the Army of the Shenandoah. The interesting cover title indicates that Sheridan and Young fully understood the clandestine nature of their activities and that they apparently believed that the new scout unit would be more successful if their future actions came as a surprise to the enemy. This is also an indication that Sheridan believed that his camp had been penetrated by Confederate spies who would soon carry the news of the creation of the new scout unit to General Jubal Early then onward to General Robert E. Lee near Petersburg. For this reason, Sheridan announced that he was forming a “scout battalion,” a unit normally composed of approximately 500 men. Confederate agents carrying this information south would magnify the actual size of Sheridan’s Scouts by a factor of ten.

overcoming. This practice is designed to permit recently trained soldiers to gain confidence by attacking an enemy target they are certain of defeating since losses don’t build confidence. Young selected an initial mission that would certainly boost the morale of the men, if they survived. It speaks well of Young’s selection process that there were no reports of straggling, retreat, or desertion as they rode together toward potentially certain death.

The vetting raid was completely successful and only a single Federal trooper was lost in the attack. Much like the earlier surprise attack at Moorefield involving Jessie Scouts, this type of operation couldn’t be repeated since the Confederate security elements involved in screening their troops movements would be alert for any second attempt. This raid, however, would have had a second and long lasting impact on the Confederates who learned of the surprise attack. Any returning patrols would be required to halt at a respectable distance from the main body and have a password. Jittery Confederate pickets probably fired at returning patrols and Young’s raid probably continued to produce casualties long after the raiders returned to camp to prepare for their next missions.

cavalry column probably actually occurred. While one of the Beymer and Edwards articles may have been responsible for the other, the small Spicer book appears to be isolated in both time and distance from the others to be independent reporting.

Care must be taken with reports that seem to corroborate one another, but may actually be “circular” and one exists because the other was previously written. Any analysis of intelligence and special operations must take “circular reporting” into account, if the results are to be accurate. The account of “The Raid” is provided separately from the Jessie scout study as an example of the difficulty encountered in verifying accounts of scout activities that required approximately twenty years to complete.